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MISSING THE POINT WITH POINT-SOURCE
"ADDITION" SEMANTICS:
SECTION 511 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
EXEMPTS INTERCONNECTED WATERWAYS
FROM SECTION 402 JURISDICTION, PERIOD?
Paul F Foley*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Environmental Law in its Second-Generation
As environmental law continues to mature in the second-generation
since the enactment of several major federal environmental statutes in the
1970s,' two important implications from its current stage of development
must be derived. First, second-generation judicial interpretation of these
statutes no longer occurs in a vacuum: the applicability of the statute's
internal provisions to a particular subset of factual circumstances has, in all
likelihood, already been litigated. Second, and corollary to the first
implication, the first-generation's establishment of precedent for interpret-
ing each of a respective statute's provisions was a necessary prerequisite
for what should now be the overriding purpose of the statute's second-
* Paul F. Foley, J.D. 2000, University of Maine School of Law; M.C.P.D. 2000,
University of Southern Maine, Edmund S. Muskie School of Public Service; B.A. 1994,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. The author, a member of the New York Bar, is an
environmental attorney and urban planner in Worcester, Massachusetts and a Ph.D.
candidate at Clark University's Graduate School of Geography. He formerly served as an
environmental attorney for the Office of the Corporation Counsel, City of New York.
1. See, e.g., the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000), enacted in 1972 to
amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000); the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (2000); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6902-6992 (2000), enacted to amend the Solid Waste
Disposal Act; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); and
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000).
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generation maturation: the articulation of jurisdictional relationships
amongst federal environmental statutes. Unless this second-generation
maturation occurs, environmental law will not evolve into a comprehensive
legal regime but will remain the same confusing morass of isolated and
contradictory statutes that the first-generation of statutory interpretation
necessarily laid the foundation to overcome.
Recent judicial interpretation of the Clean Water Act2 (CWA) threatens
to revert environmental law to its first-generation of development. This
interpretation completely fails to address the CWA's jurisdictional
relationship with other federal environmental statutes; it correspondingly
also fails to address whether almost identical factual circumstances have
already been fully litigated under federal environmental law. Regrettably,
this recent litigation has granted legitimacy to a completely novel interpre-
tation of the CWA. Thus, an area of environmental law that has been well
settled for decades has been shattered: the first-generation of environmental
law has begun again, threatening to stunt the development of the field in an
endless feedback loop involving the interpretation of fragmented provisions
of discrete environmental statutes as if each occupied completely independ-
ent fiefdoms. To understand how the CWA has recently been distorted,
and to map the proper road for the second-generation of environmental
law's development, it is first necessary to look through the near-distant
mirror of the statute's infancy period.
B. Water Diversion Structures as Near-Distant Mirror
During the early 1970s, the California Water Project (CWP) was
"designed primarily to transport water from the relatively moist climate of
northern California to the more arid central and southern portions of the
State."3 Under the CWP, water stored behind Sacramento River dams
would periodically be released into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and
then be diverted into newly constructed and existing canals and aqueducts.!
In California v. Sierra Club, a citizen group and two individual plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the construction and operation of these CWP water
diversion structures. Before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981, plaintiffs
argued that "present and proposed diversions of water from the Delta
degraded the quality of Delta water, and that such diversion violated
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899."'
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
3. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 290 (1981).
4. Id
5. Id at 291-92 (citing Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403).
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At the time Sierra Club was argued, it was axiomatic that diversions of
water by means of canals and other structures connecting navigable
waterways were subject to Section 10 jurisdiction, as had been the case for
many decades. The plaintiffs in Sierra Club knew that structures connect-
ing navigable waterways required a Section 10 permit issued by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps); it would not have even
occurred to them that Section 402 of the CWA6 (Section 402) could trump
the Army Corps long established authority over these structures. Indeed,
the idea that the CWA actually transferred permitting authority over these
structures from the Army Corps to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which issues permits for pollutant discharge
under Section 402, would have seemed absurd. Not surprisingly, then, the
plaintiffs in Sierra Club argued that the CWP required permits under
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. No mention was made of
Section 402 of the CWA.
The Supreme Court in Sierra Club did not reach the merits of the
plaintiffs' assertion that the Army Corps was required to issue a Section 10
permit for the CWP.7 Instead, it reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
a private right of action exists to enforce Section 10.8 Accordingly, the
Court placed all environmental citizen groups and potential plaintiffs on
notice that the Army Corps permitting decisions pursuant to its authority
under the Rivers and Harbors Act could not be challenged by means of
citizen suits.9
While the Supreme Court's declension to substantively decide the
merits of a claim for which no cause of action existed was, of course,
appropriate,10 an unfortunate byproduct has now ensued. Citizen suit
plaintiffs have predictably attempted to bypass the Rivers and Harbors Act
completely by asserting that Section 402 of the CWA regulates water
diversion structures as the "addition" of "pollutants"'" between intercon-
nected waterways. The reason for this plaintiff tactic is quite simple: the
CWA has an explicit citizen suit provision. 2 More surprisingly, however,
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
7. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298.
8. Id
9.1d
10. "Petitioner the State of California urges that we reach the merits of these cases ....
This we decline to do. Our ruling that there is no private cause of action permitting
respondents to commence this action disposes of the cases.... ." Id
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1362(12) (defining the
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source").
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(2000). TheCWA's citizen suit provision applies only to effluent
limitations regulated by EPA under Section 402; it does not grant citizen standing to
challenge the Army Corps exercise of authority regulating activity involving the discharge
20031
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is that this opportunistic environmental lawyering has been greeted by
courts with a collective legal amnesia. As a result, over two decades since
the Sierra Club decision, the law concerning water diversion structures is
in complete disarray. Meanwhile, the fact that interbasin water transfer has
been regulated by the Rivers and Harbors Act since its inception in 1899
has been completely and, rather inexplicably, overlooked. 3
Two recent federal appellate decisions 4 have held that interbasin water
transfer requires a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit issued by EPA pursuant to its authority under Section 402
of the CWA."5 Neither of these decisions address Section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act; interested defendant parties have apparently completely
neglected Section 10 in their respective pleadings, nor has it occurred to
courts to address this threshold jurisdictional issue. However, plaintiffs in
Sierra Club pursued a Section 10 cause of action-and not a Section 402
CWA claim-before the Supreme Court in 1981 for a clearly definable
reason: The CWA, by its express terms in Section 511, does not apply to
the Secretary of the Army's authority under Section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act. 6
Despite this Supreme Court precedent, plaintiffs in recent litigation
have successfully argued that Section 402 of the CWA requires an NPDES
permit for all artificial connections between formerly discrete waterways. "
Each dam, canal, aqueduct, channel, or pipeline connecting waterways may
now require a NPDES permit where each causes water from one waterbody
to be diverted into a more pristine waterbody. Thus, literally thousands of
these structures, which are already permitted by the Army Corps under the
Rivers and Harbors Act, may now require Section 402 permits-even
though Section 402 has no applicability to these Army Corps structures.
Without exaggeration, this recent litigation is the most significant
interpretation of the CWA in the last decade.' 8 Most disturbing, however,
of dredged and fill material pursuant to Section 404 of the CWA. Id.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
14. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. S. Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 280
F.3d 1364 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
16. See id § 137 1(a).
17. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
18. Fifteen U.S. Senators wrote a letter requesting the Solicitor General's support of
the petition for certiorari (it was nevertheless opposed). See National Water Resources
Association, Senators Champion Water Users, States' Rights, available at http://www.
propertyresearch.org/senators-champion_water..users.htm (Feb. 24, 2003). If upheld, this
recent litigation may subject the over two million dams and diversion structures throughout
the United States to Section 402 permit requirements. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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is that a provision of the CWA that facially contradicts this interpretation
is nowhere mentioned in this litigation; it has, indeed, been completely
overlooked.
The first of these two recent cases, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v.
South Florida Water Management District, has been granted certiorari by
the U.S. Supreme Court. 9 It is therefore imperative that the relationship
between Section 402 and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act be
immediately addressed. If it is not, the Supreme Court may only address
the limited issue Miccosukee Tribe or a similar case ultimately presents
before it: whether the elements requiring a Section 402 permit, in the form
of an "addition" of a "pollutant," have been met.2 The fundamental issue,
however, is whether Section 402 of the CWA can even apply to Section 10
permits. As this article demonstrates, Section 10 permits are not subject to
Section 402 of the CWA.
This article maps the road necessary to overcome the recent quagmire
of CWA interpretation now threatening to stagnate environmental law in
its first-generation of development. Following this Introduction, Section
I of this article analyzes the development of water diversion litigation from
the time of the CWA's enactment to its recent judicial interpretation as
requiring Section 402 permits for water diversion structures connecting
previously discrete waterways. Section m of this article discusses the
CWA's Section 511 prohibition against interference with the Secretary of
the Army's authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act and situates Section
511 within the CWA's legislative history. Section IV of this article
demonstrates that the scope of the Army Corps Section 10 authority under
the Rivers and Harbors Act includes all water diversion structures and
activities affecting the "footprint" of navigable waters; it then examines
Section 401 of the CWA2 as the necessary jurisdictional link between the
CWA and the Rivers and Harbors Act.
The conclusion of this article outlines the procedure wherein potential
defendants can demonstrate that Section 511 of the CWA exempts
structures operating under existing Section 10 permits from Section 402
permit requirements. Establishing this precedent at the earliest opportunity
will thereby prevent this issue from causing a further regression in
environmental law during what should be its second-generation of
19. Miccosukee Tribe of Florida Indians v. S. Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d
1364 (1 th Cir. 2002), cert granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 378 (U.S. July 27, 2003) (No. 02-626).
Oral argument was scheduled to occur on January 14, 2004.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). Section 401 requires any applicant for a federal license
or permit to obtain state certification that the proposed activity comples with applicable
effluent limitations under the CWA. Id.
2003]
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development. Finally, because only a complete absence of jurisdictional
thinking can explain otherwise capable courts and attorneys' recent failure
to address the Section 10 issue, an alternative methodology is proposed
wherein jurisdictional issues will be brought to the forefront of environ-
mental legal analysis. Unless this methodology is adopted, environmental
law will continue to be plagued by seemingly novel interpretations of
isolated environmental statutes-mere clever disguises for tattered, old
clothes and recycled arguments.
II. INTERCONNECTED WATERWAY LITIGATION
AS MANUFACTURED CRISIS
A. Crisis Created: the Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains Cases
Early in the 20th Century, the Army Corps of Engineers dug a canal
through the Everglades in Broward County, Florida to facilitate flood
control in the region.22 During the 1950s, the Army Corps expanded the
project by constructing levees and a pump station, resulting in the
conveyance of water from the canal to its surrounding basin area within the
Everglades.' In absence of the pump station and interconnected levees,
"the populated western portion of Broward County would flood within
days."' Half a century later, plaintiffs in Miccosukee Tribe have success-
fully argued before the Eleventh Circuit that this Army Corps project is
subject to EPA permitting authority under Section 402 of the CWA.' The
Army Corps permitting authority under Section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act is nowhere mentioned.
From 1917 to 1924, the world's then largest tunnel was constructed in
the Catskills of New York State by a workforce averaging over one
thousand people.' The eighteen-mile Shandaken Tunnel diverts water
from the contemporaneously built Schoharie Reservoir to the Esopus
Creek, where it runs into the Ashokan Reservoir before entering New York
City's water supply system via the Catskill Aqueduct.27 In Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, an alliance of
citizen groups convinced the Second Circuit that the eighty-year-old
22. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1366.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id at 1371.
26. Bethia Waterman, In 1917, Work Began on World's Longest Tunnel, Poughkeepsie
Journal, 2001, available at www.poughkeepsiejoumal.com/specialsections/communi-
tieslulster2/story0l.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).
27. See Catskill Watershed Corporation, A Brief Watershed History, available at
www.cwconline.org/aboutlab-hist.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).
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Shandaken Tunnel requires a Section 402 permit under the CWA for the
"discharge" of water pollutants into Esopus Creek.' Committing the same
fundamental error as the Ninth Circuit in Miccosukee Tribe, the Second
Circuit in Catskill Mountains failed to consider that the Shandaken Tunnel
and its accompanying water diversion structures are already permitted by
the Army Corps pursuant to its Section 10 authority.'
Having overlooked the fundamental legal issue as to whether EPA
under Section 402 retains the jurisdiction under the CWA to impede the
Army Corps Section 10 permitting authority, both the Ninth and Second
Circuits perform semantic gyrations in interpreting whether the elements
requiring a Section 402 permit-the "addition" of a "pollutant" from a
"point-source"-are met.' Assuming, arguendo, that Section 402 of the
CWA can have jurisdiction over Section 10 structures, which it cannot, the
respective courts' ultimate conclusion that the three elements requiring a
Section 402 permit were, in fact, present, was not devoid of logic.
Nonetheless, the agonizing process by which this conclusion was derived
should have made apparent that a jurisdictional issue was present-a
complex question of the relations amongst federal environmental statutes
now appropriate and necessary for judicial engagement during the second-
generation of environmental law's development. Unfortunately, such a
recognition did not manifest.
The Second Circuit's decision in Catskill Mountains turned on the
meaning of "addition," given that water with suspended solids was
considered to be a "pollutant" that was discharged from the Shandaken
Tunnel as the "point-source."' For there to be an "addition," the court
reasoned, a pollutant must be introduced into a navigable water from the
"outside world. ' 32 Relying entirely on intuition, rather than exploring the
statutory definition of a navigable water as extending over the entire
surface of a waterbody,33 the Second Circuit posited a distinction between
a natural watercourse and one created through artificial means. According
28. Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 493-94.
29. See idt
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6), (12), (14) (2000).
31. Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 486; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000).
32. Id. at 491 (quoting National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165
(D.C. Cir. 1982)).
33. See 33 C.F.R. 329.4 (2003). Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, "a determination
of navigability, once made, applies laterally over the entire surface of the waterbody." id.
Meanwhile, for purposes of CWA jurisdiction, waters of the United States are defined as
including "impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States" and
their "tributaries." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4-5) (2003). In either case, no distinction is made
between waters that are artificially and naturally connected. Imputing such a distinction,
while ignoring agency regulations defining the scope of navigable waters, is not within the
proper realm of the court's prudent exercise of judicial authority.
2003]
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to the Second Circuit, where water is merely recirculated or diverted from
one part of a natural watercourse to another, nothing is "added" to the
navigable water because the water had already been present within the
waterway.' In contrast, the court stated that where "water is artificially
diverted from its natural course and travels several miles from the
Reservoir through Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, a body of water
unrelated in any relevant sense to the Schorarie Reservoir and its water-
shed," an addition of pollutants occurs requiring a Section 402 permit."
Apparently, the Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains did not find it
"relevant" that these waterways had already been connected eighty years
previously. Had the court conducted a relevant inquiry, it would have
determined that these water diversion structures operate under a current
Section 10 permit. Thus, the particular portions of the presently intercon-
nected watercourse that were created artificially is irrelevant: the entire
watercourse became subject to Army Corps jurisdiction, as one navigable
water, once the Army Corps authorized this interconnection pursuant to the
Rivers and Harbors Act. Moreover, irrespective of the semantic distinction
between artificial and natural watercourses as constituting multiple or
uniform waterbodies, no Section 402 jurisdiction exists over either
naturally or artificially connected water diversion structures under the
CWA.3
Four months after the Second Circuit decided Catskill Mountains, the
Ninth Circuit issued its Miccosukee Tribe decision in 2002. 37 As in Catskill
Mountains, the Miccosukee Tribe court wrestled with the meaning of the
word "addition" as the "one legal issue. '38 Again relying entirely upon
intuition, rather than the statutory and regulatory guidance provided by the
Army Corps for determining the extent of navigable waters, the Ninth
Circuit posited that the "receiving body of water" is relevant for analyzing
34. Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 492. With mind-numbing profundity, the Second
Circuit explained that "[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and
pours it back into the pot, one has not 'added' soup or anything else to the pot (beyond,
perhaps, a de minimis quantity of airborne dust that fell into the ladle)." Id. Soup analogies
need not, however, be resorted to during environmental law's second-generation of
development. When the temptation arises, courts should instead raise the jurisdictional
questions appropriate for the development of a second-generation environmental legal
regime. Once these jurisdictional issues are addressed, the letters within the soup bowl will,
thankfully, read quite differently.
35. id. (emphasis added).
36. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.8(a) (2003). "Determinations [of navigability] are not limited
to the natural or original condition of the waterbody ... [ain artificial channel may often
constitute a navigable water of the United States ... ." Id.
37. Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1366.
38. ld at 1367.
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whether an addition of a pollutant has occurred. 39 Thus, if the point-source
is the cause-in-fact of the addition of pollutants into the receiving water, a
Section 402 permit is required.' Following this tautology to its inexorable
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit decided that "but for" the pumping station,
the natural flow of water would not have entered the receiving basin area
within the Everglades.41
Stated differently, the import of the Ninth Circuit's decision is that any
artificial water connection is, by definition, the cause-in-fact of a pollutant
addition into any natural waterbody."2 In contrast, the addition of water
pollutants from a natural hydrological connection is not really an addition
-simply because it is 'natural." 3 Once the philosophic essentialism
behind this nature fetishization is accepted, however, nothing natural can
be the but-for cause of anything: nature is, was, and ever shall be. To be
sure, this philosophy may have some spiritual appeal, but it has nothing to
do with statutory interpretation of the CWA. More strikingly, this
philosophy would nullify the entire Rivers and Harbors Act," the purpose
of which is precisely to determine which artificial structures become
integrated into the navigable waters of the United States. Indeed,
"[d]eterminations [of navigability] are not limited to the natural or original
condition of the waterbody."' 5 Nature aside, a canal can unquestionably be
a navigable water.'
The Ninth Circuit in Miccosukee Tribe characterized the CWA as
prohibiting the "discharge of pollutants from a point source into navigable
waters without an NPDES (Section 402) permit."4  This is simply a
misstatement of the CWA. Activities regulated under the Army Corps
Section 404 CWA jurisdiction involve the discharge of pollutants from a
point-source and do not require Section 402 permits." Additionally, as this
article discusses below in more detail, Section 511 of the CWA excludes
Section 402's application to water diversion structures regulated by the
39. Id. at 1368.
40. Id
41. I&
42. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1368.
43. See i&
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (2000).
45. 33 C.F.R. § 329.8(a) (2003).
46. See idt "Canals which connect two navigable waters of the United States and which
are used for commerce clearly fall within the test, and themselves become navigable." Id.
47. Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1367.
48. See33U.S.C. § 1344(2000) (permits for dredge and fill material). Discharges of
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States which are regulated under section
404 of the CWA." 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b) (2003) (delineating discharges excluded from
NPDES permit requirements).
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Army Corps pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act, regardless of whether
the discharge of a pollutant is involved.49 Had the Miccosukee Tribe court
instead been more sufficiently oriented towards jurisdictional questions, it
would have become aware of both the distinction between Section 402 and
Section 404 CWA jurisdiction, and the need for exploring the jurisdictional
relationship between the CWA and other federal environmental statutes.
B. Water Diversion Litigation: How Interpretation of a Non-Issue
Became the Legal Issue
The seemingly novel issue of CWA interpretation by which the Catskill
Mountains and Miccosukee Tribe courts were confronted had been framed
by two decades of previous litigation. This litigation had patently rejected
all claims that water diversion structures could be subject to Section 402 of
the CWA. Nonetheless, the reasons courts gave for summarily rejecting
Section 402's applicability concerned the statutory construction of its
provisions; thejurisdictional applicability of Section 402 to water diversion
structures was not questioned. Having neglected the jurisdictional
question, courts left the door open for the water diversion issue to again
rear its ugly head two decades later.
When the U.S. Supreme Court held in California v. Sierra Club that no
private right of action existed to enforce Section 10 permit requirements for
water diversion structures,' plaintiffs immediately sought to sidestep the
Rivers and Harbors Act by claiming that certain water diversion structures
violated other environmental statutes. Asserting that an Environmental
Impact Statement was required for proposed water diversion structures
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act,5' plaintiff Oklahoma
Wildlife Federation unsuccessfully brought suit against the Army Corps in
1988.52 The court held that no Environmental Impact Statement was
required because "[t]here is an established history of interbasin transfers of
water," including the "transfer of water with rather high total dissolved
solids levels for mixing with higher quality water ... Thereafter,
plaintiffs exclusively focused their litigation efforts on Section 402 of the
CWA, avoiding any mention of the Army Corps long-established authority
over water diversion structures altogether.
49. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
50. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 292.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
52. Oklahoma Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 681 F.
Supp. 1470, 1479 (N.D. Okl. 1988).
53. hd
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Within a year of the Sierra Club decision, environmental plaintiffs had
successfully recast the framework of the debate concerning permit
requirements for interconnected water structures by singularly focusing
upon Section 402 of the CWA. In National Wildlife Federation v.
Gorsuch, a citizen group asserted that a dam's discharge of water with low
levels of dissolved oxygen from a reservoir to another waterbody violated
the CWA.5' While the D.C. Circuit rejected plaintiff's claim, the court's
analysis involved an exhaustive interpretation of Section 402's provisions
to inform its holding that EPA's interpretation of the terms "addition" and
"pollutant" was reasonable and therefore entitled to deference.55 Despite
the D.C. Circuit's attempted thoroughness in deconstructing Section 402's
terms, the lack of breadth by which the court treated the larger environmen-
tal issue of pollution from dams-structures that had exclusively been
under the Army Corps Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction for several
generations56-was remarkable, particularly in the wake of the Sierra Club
decision. The Gorsuch court's establishment of this limited mode of
analysis as methodological precedent allowed subsequent plaintiffs to
ignore the Rivers and Harbors Act with impunity.
The Sixth Circuit held, in National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power Company, that water containing entrained fish, discharged from the
Ludington hydro-electric facility into Lake Michigan did not constitute a
pollutant discharge subject to Section 402." Once again focusing upon the
meaning of the term "addition," the court reasoned that because the
Ludington facility initially obtains water containing fish from Lake
Michigan, the redeposit of both live and dead fish into that same waterbody
after power has been generated "adds" no pollutants from the outside
world.5"
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation that nothing "new" is added to a
waterbody when live fish are removed and their entrails subsequently
redeposited was, of course, debatable. The court in Consumers Power,
however, deferred to EPA's construction of the CWA as not requiring
Section 402 permits for these redeposits.59 In absence of that agency
54. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Anne Gorsuch was sued in her official capacity as Administrator of EPA. Id.
55. Id. at 177. The court here deferred to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its
statutory mandate (citing EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association, 449 U.S. 64, 83
(1980)). Id.
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
57. National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580,585 (6th Cir.
1988).
58. 1& As the court stated, "[tihere can be no doubt that the Ludington facility does
not create the fish which become entrained in the process of generating electricity." Id.
59. id at 584.
2003]
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deference, it was in hindsight inevitable for some courts to instead conclude
that an addition of a pollutant requiring a Section 402 permit does, in fact,
occur under these or similar circumstances. Nearly fifteen years later, this
is precisely what the Catskill Mountains and Miccosukee Tribe courts
decided.60
To its credit, the Consumers Power court at least attempted to bypass
intuition by addressing the issue before it in terms of the constitution of
navigable waters-not merely by intuiting non-natural waterflows as
necessarily constituting pollutant additions. The Sixth Circuit's statement
that the "water which passes through the Ludington facility never loses its
status as water of the United States,' s was a tacit admission that Section
402 jurisdiction cannot exist, nor can a discharge of pollutants occur,
entirely within the boundaries of navigable waters. Unfortunately, the
Consumers Power court did not feel it necessary to follow through with the
implications of its analysis: lack of Section 402 jurisdiction over pollutants
already flowing within interconnected navigable waters implies either that
no such jurisdiction exists under federal environmental law or that this
jurisdiction has been vested in another statute. Upon examination, the
Sixth Circuit would have determined that this jurisdiction over navigable
waters is indeed vested in another federal environmental statute: the Army
Corps retains exclusive jurisdiction over waterflow between artificially or
naturally interconnected waterbodies pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act.6
2
The Consumers Power court's failure to address the scope of Section
402 jurisdiction, despite its seeming recognition that no addition can occur
within water that "never loses its status as water of the United States,"
narrowed the issue to one of mere statutory interpretation of Section 402's
provisions.63 Accordingly, the larger question of Section 402's scope has,
predictably, not been raised since Consumers Power. Most importantly,
Consumers Power had completely set the stage for another court to
subsequently determine that the existing pattern of flow between already
interconnected water structures violates Section 402. This is precisely what
the Ninth Circuit decided when it heard the issue in 1993.64
In Mokelumne River v. East Bay, a municipal utility district constructed
a dam and other impoundments in 1978 to minimize the amount of acid
mine drainage that had previously been flowing into the Mokelumne River
60. See Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481; Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364.
61. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 589.
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
63. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 589.
64. See Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utility District,
13 F.3d 305, 310 (9th Cir. 1993).
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as surface runoff.65 The reservoir and dam succeeded in containing almost
all of the acid mine runoff and dramatically reduced the amount of
pollutants entering the river.' Nonetheless, because a small fraction of this
water and drainage occasionally passed "over the spillway or through the
dam's discharge valve into the Mokelunne River,"67 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that this spillage constituted a point-source addition of pollutants
in violation of Section 402. The court readily admitted that finding the
utility district liable, fifteen years after the project's completion, for nearly
eradicating the amount of pollutants entering the river-when the district
would have suffered no liability whatsoever had it done nothing-was a
perverse outcome." But the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e are not
policymakers. We must simply apply the law."69 To the Ninth Circuit, the
elements requiring a Section 402 permit were clearly met; it did not even
occur to the court, or to defendant's attorneys, to first explore Section 402's
jurisdictional relationship with other federal environmental statutes. Thus,
while the Ninth Circuit may accurately have been described as "applying"
a law--the Clean Water Act-it made no effort to determine what the law,
in terms of a greater environmental regulatory regime, actually was.
The collective legal amnesia the Mokelunme River decision represented
had become fully petrified by the time the Second Circuit heard Catskill
Mountains in 2001 and the Eleventh Circuit decided Miccosukee Tribe the
following year.' Despite the Sierra Club plaintiffs' argument before the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1981 that water diversion structures violated
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,71 courts and respective attorneys
alike came to blindly accept the premise that only Section 402 of the CWA
applied to water diversion structures. Stated differently, the implications
of these structures' operation under existing Army Corps permits were not
drawn because neither courts nor respective attorneys seemed to recognize
65. d at 307.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Id at 310. As Justice Fernandez, in a concurring opinion, stated:
Appellants earnestly argue that the EPA's approach, and that of the appellee's, will not
serve the long-term purpose of bettering the aquatic environment. They indicate that
it takes no genius or epopt to see what the message will be. Do nothing! Let someone
else take on the responsibility. Let the water degrade, let your fish die, but protect
your pocketbook from vast and unnecessary expenditures. Do not try to bring some
order out of environmental chaos. In short, appellants suggest that no Odysseus or
Daedalus crafted the policy which we are now asked to follow. Perhaps they are
correct; I suspect they are.
Id.
69. Committee to Save Mokelumne River, 13 F.3d at 310.
70. See Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481; Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364.
71. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 292.
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that an environmental statute does not exist as an independent fiefdom; its
scope of jurisdiction is, rather, defined by the other environmental statutes
that may retain jurisdiction over the same type of activity.
The amnesia caused by the first-generation emphasis on statutory
provisions, at the expense of a second-generation emphasis on jurisdic-
tional relations among environmental statutes, has been historically traced
in this section. This article now recreates the memories that this amnesia
has dissipated through an articulation of the law that does actually exist,
despite first-generation environmental practitioners and courts' demon-
strated ignorance of this persistent reality.
El. SECION 511 OF THE CWA AND THE SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY'S AUTHORITY
A. The Section 511 Prohibition
Section 511(a)(2) of the CWA states that the CWA "shall not be
construed" as "affecting or impairing the authority of the Secretary of the
Army (A) to maintain navigation or (B) under the Act of March 3,
1899 .... ,,2 The "Act of March 3, 1899," to which Section 511 refers, is
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.7' Thus, by the CWA's explicit terms,
the CWA cannot "affect or impair" the Secretary of the Army's navigation
authority or "affect or impair" the Secretary's authority under the Rivers
and Harbors Act.7 4 Pursuant to the Secretary of the Army's authority, the
Army Corps issues permits for activities affecting navigable waters.75
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (2000) (emphasis added). Section 511 (a) of the CWA reads,
in its entirety, as follows:
(a) Impairment of authority or functions of officials and agencies; treaty provisions
This chapter shall not be construed as (1) limiting the authority or functions of any
officer or agency of the United States under any other law or regulation not
inconsistent with this chapter; (2) affecting or impairing the authority of the Secretary
of the Army (A) to maintain navigation or (B) under the Act of March 3, 1899; except
that any permit issued under section 1344 of this title shall be conclusive as to the
effect on water quality of any discharge resulting from any activity subject to section
403 of this title, or (3) affecting or impairing the provisions of any treaty of the United
States.
Id.
73. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (2000). The Notes on Section 1371 (Section 511 of the
CWA) state that the "Act of March 3, 1899 referred to in subsec. (a), is act Mar. 3, 1899...
which enacted sections 401,403, 404, 406, 407, 508, 409, 411 to 416, 418, 502, 549, and
687 of this title [referring to title 33 of the U.S. Code]." 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (2000).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a).
75. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403. "The construction of any structure in or over any
navigable water of the United States, the excavating from or depositing of material in such
waters, or the accomplishment of any other work affecting the course, location, condition,
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Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act prohibits altering or
modifying, "in any manner," the "course, location, condition, or capacity
of' any navigable water, including canals or "the channel of any navigable
water," without the Secretary of the Army's authorization.76 This language
is extremely broad: requiring a Section 402 permit for a canal pump station,
as in Miccosukee Tribe--and the prospect of the canal's continued
operation being cast in doubt-is, on its face, a change in the "condition,
or capacity of' that canal in some "manner."'78 Any such change in the
condition or capacity of a waterbody must be approved by the Army Corps
under Section 10-not by EPA under Section 402 of the CWA. In contrast,
vesting EPA with this authority under the CWA, and thereby negating the
Army Corps permitting authority, by definition "affect or impairs" the
authority of the Secretary of the Army under the Rivers and Harbors Act.
Section 511 of the CWA explicitly prohibits this. Accordingly, despite the
Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains courts' apparent ignorance of
Section 511, their respective holdings that EPA has final permitting
authority over these structures nonetheless constitutes a facial violation of
the CWA. 79
Section 511 of the CWA, however, does not preclude the CWA's
applicability to any structure or activity previously regulated by the
Secretary of the Army.' The CWA does, in fact, apply to many of these
activities and Section 511 makes clear to which of these activities the CWA
specifically applies. Although Section 511 generally prohibits any
impairment whatsoever of the Army Corps authority under the Rivers and
Harbors Act, one exception to this is itemized: "except that any permit
issued under section [404] shall be conclusive as to the effect on water
quality of any discharge resulting from any activity subject to section [10
of the Act of March 3, 1899]."'" The word "except" here is important; it
or capacity of such waters is unlawful unless the work has been recommended by the Chief
of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The instrument of authorization
is designated a permit." 33 C.F.R. § 320.2 (b).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000) (emphasis added).
[l]t shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the
course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal,
lake, harbor or refuge, or enclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the
channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army
prior to beginning the same.
i
77. Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1367.
78. See 33 U.S.C. § 403.
79. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
80. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
81. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(emphasis added). The exception is delineated in section (a)(2),
immediately following Section 511's prohibition against "affecting or impairing" the
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acknowledges that a water quality requirement is, in fact, an impairment to
the Secretary of the Army's authority-an impairment that is permissible
under the CWA only because it is specifically enumerated as an
exception.82 Were Section 402 also considered to be an exception to the
general prohibition against impairment of the Secretary of the Army's
authority "in any manner," 3 it would have been delineated in Section 511
along with the Section 404 exception." No such enumeration exists in
Section 511, however, precisely because Section 402 of the CWA does not
apply to structures and activities under the Army Corps jurisdiction. 5
The Army Corps regulations implementing Section 10 also underscore
EPA's lack of authority under Section 402 to grant permits for activities or
structures affecting or impairing navigable waters.' As the implementing
regulations explain, "[tihe general legislation by which Federal agencies
are empowered to act generally is not considered to be sufficient authoriza-
tion by Congress to satisfy the purposes of Section 10.""s7 Therefore, "[i]f
an agency asserts that it has Congressional authorization meeting the test
of Section 10 . . . , the legislative history and/or provisions of the Act
should clearly demonstrate" that Congress intended that outcome.88
Requiring a Section 402 permit for a tunnel functioning as a water channel,
as in Catskill Mountains,89 or for a canal, as in Miccosukee Tribe,90 affects
or impairs the condition or capacity of these navigable waters. 9' Accord-
ingly, a Section 402 permit for this effect or impairment could only be
authorized by Congress's explicit vesting of this Section 10 authority to
Secretary of the Army's authority. Id.
82. Id.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
85. See id.
86. See 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(c)(2) (2003).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 492. "For purposes of a section 10 permit, a
tunnel or other structure or work under or over a navigable water of the United States is
considered to have an impact on the navigable capacity of the waterbody." 33 C.F.R. §
322.3(a) (2003). Id.
90. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364. Section 10 retains jurisdiction over any
canal or artificial waterway "if at some point in its construction or operation it results in an
effect on the course, location, condition, or capacity of navigable waters." 33 C.F.R. §
322.5(g) (2003). The plaintiffs in Miccosukee Tribe sought to require a Section 402 permit
for the "operation" of a canal pump station which, they alleged, alters the "condition" of
navigable waters. Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1367. The harms the plaintiffs alleged are
therefore clearly under Section 10 Army Corps jurisdiction; these grounds alone warranted
dismissal of plaintiff's Section 402 claim in Miccosukee Tribe.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
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EPA. 2 Congress, however, not only failed to affirmatively grant EPA this
authority but, in the plain language of Section 511,93 explicitly prohibited
EPA from its exercise. Under the CWA, the Secretary of the Army retains
full Section 10 authority. 4
The Army Corps has jurisdiction over both Section 404 of the CWA,
which regulates discharges of dredged and fill material into navigable
waters, including wetlands," and the Rivers and Harbors Act." Section
404 of the CWA cannot, therefore, be said to "impair" or "affect" the Army
Corps authority over structures or activities within navigable waters.'
Indeed, the only federal court that has analyzed the scope of Section 511
has held that Section 511 does not exempt the Army Corps from complying
with Section 404 permitting requirements.9" Moreover, the Section 404
92. It should be noted that this does not mean that EPA's Section 402 authority and the
Army Corps Section 10 authority are mutually exclusive. More accurately, the two can co-
exist but, when this does occur, EPA's Section 402 authority is subordinate to Section 10.
Thus, an outfall pipe permitted under EPA's NPDES program, like any structure within
navigable waters, requires a Section 10 permit. A Section 10 structure, however, such as an
artificial waterway, does not require a Section 402 permit to authorize its functioning and
operation as a waterway; that authority is exclusively vested by Section 511 of the CWA to
the Secretary of the Army. The CWA, by its explicit terms, does not impair the Army Corps
Section 10 authority through the superimposition of another agency's permitting
requirements. In contrast, the Secretary of the Army's authority is hardly impaired when a
Section 402 permit requires Army Corps approval under Section 10.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
94. Id. As a condition of EPA's delegation of its NPDES authority to the states,
Section 402 requires assurance that "no permit will be issued if, in the judgment of the
Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of Engineers ... anchorage and navigation
of any of the navigable waters would be substantially impaired thereby." 33 U.S.C. §
1342(b)(6) (2000). This explicit provision further demonstrates that Section 402 does not
apply to activities and structures under the Army Corps Section 10 jurisdiction.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
96. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (2000).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(2000). The Army Corps, in
fact, jointly administers the Rivers and Harbors Act and Section 404 permits under the
nationwide permit program. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(g) (2003).
98. Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 387 F. Supp. 292,4 ELR 20437 (R.I.
1974). Here, the Army Corps, as defendant, claimed that its actions were not subject to
Section 404 because this would "impair" or "affect" the Secretary of the Army's authority
in violation of CWA Section 51 1(a). IU at 300-01. The court, correctly, refused to read
Section 51 1(a) this broadly because the Army Corps was itself charged with implementing
Section 404 of the CWA. Id. The court refused to exempt the Army Corps, in other words,
from complying with its own permit requirements. Section 402 of the CWA, however, was
not addressed; the Army Corps, as a federal agency, unquestionably must follow its own
Section 10 and Section 404 permit requirements. Section 511 does state, however, that the
Army Corps permit requirements cannot themselves be rendered invalid through
subordination to EPA's Section 402 permitting regime. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
Thus, even under the most narrow construction of Section 511, conditioning Army Corps
permits upon receipt of an additional Section 402 permit "impairs" or"affects" the Secretary
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exception" makes evident that water quality determinations for activities
under the Army Corps jurisdiction are not subject to Section 402. Under
the CWA, Section 402 jurisdiction and Section 404 jurisdiction are
mutually exclusive, because no activity can be subject to both EPA and the
Army Corps CWA jurisdiction. Either a Section 402 or a Section 404
permit may be required for an activity regulated under the CWA, but never
both. 10
Except for the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, Section 511 explicitly
supplanted the Secretary of the Army of the authority vested by previous
statutes."1 The CWA overrides the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1910 and
the Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888 "except as to effect on navigation and
anchorage."'" This exception is again meaningful because it underscores
Congress's intent to preserve the Secretary of the Army's authority, without
"affect" or "impairment,"'0 3 over activities subject to Section 10 while the
Army Corps authority over other activities was removed by the new
legislation. These activities were instead delegated to EPA under the
CWA. While the plain language of Section 511 makes the intent of
Congress sufficiently unambiguous for an analysis of legislative history to
be conducted of necessity, an analysis of Section 511 in the context of the
CWA's legislative history is nonetheless warranted. Having completely
overlooked the Section 511 argument in recent litigation, courts and
practitioners alike might otherwise be loathe to admit that the explanation
for Section 402's inapplicability to activities and structures permitted under
Section 10 is, indeed, as simple as it will appear.
of the Army's authority. Id.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (2000).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2003). "Exclusions. The following discharges do not require
NPDES permits: (b) Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States
which are regulated under section 404 of the CWA." I Additionally, Section 402 requires
a permit except as provided in Section 404. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2003).
101. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(b). Section 511(b) of the CWA appears, in its entirety, as
follows:
(b) Discharges of pollutants into navigable waters
Discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters subject to the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1910 and the Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888 shall be regulated pursuant to
this chapter, and not subject to such Act of 1910 and the Act of 1888 except as to
effect on navigation and anchorage.
Id.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2000).
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B. Section 511 and the CWA's Legislative History
Four years before the CWA was enacted in 1972, the Army Corps
revised its regulations governing permit applications to assess the "effect
of the proposed work on navigation, fish and wildlife, conservation,
pollution, esthetics, ecology, and the general public interest."" General
Groves, as the Chief of the Army Corps, stated in a 1971 hearing before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution that "we have required detailed
information on effluents passing through a section 10 structure, [since] May
of 1970." 1°5 In response to Senator Edward Muskie's queries, General
Groves further elaborated that "as the water quality standards emerged and
became apparent to us that Section 10 and Section 13 were related, which
they very definitely are, we felt compelled to require this additional
information on effluents."'" The "section 13" to which General Groves
referred is Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (Section 13),
a section which "is popularly known as the 'Refuse Act'... ."10- Section
13 was replaced by Section 402 of the CWA; in accordance with Section
402's explicit terms, no further Section 13 permits were issued after
1972." Thus, just prior to the CWA's enactment in 1972, the Army Corps
had already incorporated environmental considerations into the permit
application process for Section 10 permits; applications for Section 10
permits required information on effluents passing through Section 10
structures; and the Section 10 and Section 13 programs administered by the
Army Corps were acknowledged to be "very definitely" related.
The federal courts have recently explored, in some depth, the historical
relationship between Section 10 and Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act and Section 402 and Section 404 of the CWA. 10 In Kentuckians v.
Rivenburgh,"° the federal district court in West Virginia attempted to
delineate the boundary between Section 402 and Section 404 jurisdiction. "'
According to the court, "Section 10 does not [nor did it ever] control waste
or refuse disposal," and Section 404, as a decedent to Section 10, likewise
104. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 214 n.27 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing former 33 C.F.R. §
209.120(d)(1)).
105. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Comm.
on Public Works, 92nd Cong. 92-1427 (1971) (statement of General Groves).
106. Id (emphasis added).
107. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
108. See id § 1342(a).
109. See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927,935
(S.D.W.Va. 2002); rev'd by 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
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cannot regulate these discharges.1 2 The Fourth Circuit promptly over-
turned this decision, finding that the lower court "erred in concluding that
[Section] 10 regulated only beneficial fills, not waste.11 3 The Fourth
Circuit explained that Section 10 "is sufficiently broad to prohibit the
discharge of any fill material, including waste ..... 1,4 Indeed, prior to the
CWA's adoption, Section 10 and Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
were, quite simply, "very definitely" related; both permit applications
required information on effluent discharges, and the Army Corps often
issued a dual permit covering both Section 10 and Section 13. s
The CWA was adopted in October 1972 when Congress passed the
Senate bill after conference with the House of Representatives." l6 The
Senate Conference Report ("the Conference Report") states that "Section
511 preserves the authority of other Federal laws which are consistent with
this Act, specifically the Secretary of the Army to maintain navigation and
his authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899..'... Further
elaboration in delineating the scope of Section 511(a) is not provided.,"
The commentary on Section 511(c), moreover, merely summarizes the
following text of 33 U.S.C. § 1371(h): "Discharges of pollutants into the
navigable waters subject to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1910... and the
Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888... shall be regulated pursuant to this
chapter [the CWA], and not subject to such Act of 1910 and the Act of
1888 except as to effect on navigation and anchorage.""9 The statutory
text of Section 511(b) is important, however, because it explicitly states
that some "discharges of pollutants" are not subject to the CWA.12 While
pollutant discharges are generally subject to the CWA, Section 511(b)
explicitly excepts pollutant discharges concerning "navigation and
anchorage."'' Taken together, then, Section 511(a) and Section 511(b)
make clear that pollutant discharges concerning navigation remain under
the exclusive purview of the Secretary of the Army and cannot be regulated
112. ldat935-36.
113. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 439 (4th Cir.
2003).
114. lit
115. See Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm on Air and Water Pollution of the
Comm. on Public Works, 92nd Cong. 92-H27 (1971) (statements of General Groves).
116. See S. REP. No. 92-1236 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N., 3825-3826.
117. S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 3825 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N., 2d Session,
3825-3826.
118. See id. Most Congressional debate concerning Section 511 of the CWA instead
addressed the applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act. Id.; see also 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (the National Environmental Policy Act).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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by Section 402 of the CWA. Unfortunately, despite this plain statutory
language, neither Miccosukee Tribe nor Catskill Mountains even contem-
plate that the CWA, by its explicit terms in Section 511, has no applicabil-
ity to this-or any-subset of pollutant discharges.' This is a grave
oversight.
Congressperson Dingell, in urging the House's approval of the
Conference Report, stated, "[tihe bill does not repeal the Refuse Act of
1899. It still remains available to prevent the discharge of polluting wastes.
In addition, section 51 (a) of the bill specifically preserves the authority of
the Secretary of the Army under the Refuse Act."'" In this statement,
Congressperson Dingell was evidently referring to the entire Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 as the Refuse Act-not merely to Section 13.'
21
Nonetheless, his statement clearly evinces Congress' understanding that
some pollutant discharges would remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Secretary of the Army, namely, pollutant discharges affecting naviga-
tion under Section 10."2
The plain language of Section 511 makes clear that the Secretary of the
Army's authority under Section 10 could not be impaired by the CWA.
12 6
Analysis of the legislative history and the text of Section 511(b),' 27
however, further underscores Congress's intent for those discharges of
pollutants affecting navigation to remain under the Secretary' sjurisdiction.
This jurisdiction over pollutant discharges includes the Army Corps
Section 404 jurisdiction" 8 and its Section 10 authority."n The Fourth
Circuit, moreover, has affirmed that the Army Corps Section 10 authority
includes pollutant discharges. 3° Accordingly, a water diversion structure
may require either or both a Section 10 and a Section 404 permit from the
122. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
123. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE WATER PoLnTON CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972, 93RD CONG. IST SESS., at 255 (1972). The House considered the Conference Report
on October 4, 1972.
124. See id. Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act is "popularly known as the
'Refuse Act."' 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). Section 13 was replaced by Section 402 of the
CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
125. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE WATER POLuTION CONTROLACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972, 93RD CoNG. IST SEsS., at 255 (1973).
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
127. See id § 1371(b). "Discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters ... shall be
regulated pursuant to this chapter... except as to effect on navigation and anchorage." Id.
(emphasis added).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
129. See id. § 403 (2000).
130. See Kentuckiansfor the Commonwealth, 317 F.3d at 439.
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Army Corps; but by Section 511's explicit terms' it does not require a
Section 402 permit under the CWA.'3 2
IV. THE CoRps' AUTHORITY AND SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND
HARBORS ACT
A. The Army Corps Section 10 Authority
Navigation and the protection of navigation is "a primary concern of
the federal government" and not the states.'33 Without the Army Corps
permit approval, any activity, including "the construction of any structure
in or over any navigable water," or "any other work affecting the course,
location, condition, or capacity of such waters is unlawful.""' The Army
Corps permitting decisions are based on an assessment of cumulative
environmental impacts; these include wetlands, water supply, floodplain
values and "general environmental concerns."'35 Pursuant to its nationwide
permit program, the Army Corps issues permits (NWPs) for activities not
requiring an individual permit application." 6 NWPs "can be issued to
satisfy the permit requirements of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899.' ' 117 An NWP was issued in July of 1977 for "structures or work
completed before December 18, 1968, or in waterbodies over which the DE
[the Army Corps] had not asserted jurisdiction at the time the activity
occurred."' 38 Thus, pursuant to its authority under Section 10, the Army
Corps has permitted all structures, within its jurisdiction, completed prior
to December 1968. 9 Unless these permitted activities are modified, "they
do not require further permitting."'"
The structures in both Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains are
within the navigable waters of the United States and are under the Army
Corps Section 10 jurisdiction.' 4 ' In Miccosukee Tribe, the Army Corps
131. 33 U.S.C. § 137 1(a).
132. See id. § 1342.
133. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(o)(3) (2003).
134. See id. § 320.4(b). Hydropower and other power generation structures are
permitted under the Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (2000).
135. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2003).
136. See id. § 330.1.
137. See id. § 330.1(g).
138. See id § 330.3.
139. Id.
140. 3 C.F.R. § 330.3 (2003) "Activities completed under the authorization of an NWP
which was in effect at the time the activity was completed continue to be authorized by that
NWP." See id § 330.6(b).
141. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
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itself built the canals through the Everglades wetlands in the early 1900s; 142
these canals are navigable waters of the United States under Section 10
jurisdiction, 43 while the larger wetlands system is subject to the Army
Corps Section 404 authority.'" In Catskill Mountains, meanwhile, the
Shandaken Tunnel connects two reservoirs to a creek. 145 "For purposes of
a Section 10 permit, a tunnel or other structure or work under or over a
navigable water of the United States is considered to have an impact on the
navigable capacity of the waterbody"' 4 and is therefore subject to the
Army Corps jurisdiction. The Shandaken Tunnel is also a power transmis-
sion line that required a Section 10 permit because it is not subject to the
Federal Power Act.'47 Moreover, the reservoirs and creeks are themselves
navigable waters,' and a determination of navigability... applies laterally
over the entire surface of the waterbody."'49 The Army Corps therefore
retains jurisdiction over all of the water diversion structures in Miccosukee
Tribe and Catskill Mountains.
The structures in Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains operate
under existing NWPs promulgated by the Army Corps in 1977."5 The
Army Corps regulations implementing the NWP program explicitly state
that these NWPs remain effective unless the activities are modified. '' The
pump station and accompanying levees in Miccosukee Tribe were
completed in the 1950s,' 52 and the Shandaken Tunnel was completed in
1924.' 3 Accordingly, these structures were completed well before
December 1968 and continue to operate under this Army Corps NWP.' 5
142. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1366.
143. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
144. See id. § 1344.
145. See Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 492.
146. 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (2003).
147. See id § 322.5(i).
148. See id. § 328.3(a). The Army Corps issued regulations applicable to reservoirs at
the headwaters of the Mississippi River; these regulations, issued pursuant to Section 10
jurisdiction, address water diversions from reservoirs: "The accumulation of water in, and
discharge of water from the reservoirs, including that from one reservoir to another, shall be
under the direction of the U.S. District Engineer." See id. § 207.340(d). Although these
regulations have not been made explicit for all reservoir discharges, it nonetheless makes
clear that reservoir discharges are under Section 10 jurisdiction.
149. See id § 329.4.
150. See id § 330.3.
151. 33 C.F.R. § 330.3 (2003).
152. Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1366.
153. See generally Bethia Waterman, In 1917, Work Began on World's Largest Tunnel,
Poughkeepsie Journal, 2001, available at www.poughkeepsiejournal.comlspecialsections/
communities/ulster2/story0l.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).
154. 33 U.S.C. § 330.3 (2000).
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Existing Army Corps Section 10 permits cannot be modified by Section
402 permits. Instead, an established mechanism for modifying existing
Section 10 permits is clearly delineated in the Army Corps regulations; this
mechanism has no relation whatsoever to Section 402 permits.'"5 Courts'
imposition of a Section 402 permitting requirement on existing Section 10
permits directly contradicts these regulations and these decisions are,
accordingly, facially invalid." The Army Corps retains discretionary
authority to "modify, suspend, or revoke NWP authorizations."' 57 Should
the Army Corps determine that an existing NWP "would result in more
than minimal.., adverse effects on the environment," it must "modify the
NWP authorization to reduce or eliminate the adverse impacts, or notify the
prospective permittee" that the NWP is no longer authorized."8 The Army
Corps encourages public input: "Anyone may, at any time, suggest to the
Chief of Engineers... changes to existing NWPs."' 59 In deciding whether
to exercise its discretion to modify, revoke or suspend an NWP, the Army
Corps considers, among other things, "changes in circumstances" since the
NWP was issued and "cumulative adverse environmental effects resulting
from activities occurring under the NWP.' ' "w The specificity of these
procedures only makes apparent that Section 402 provides no jurisdiction
for EPA to modify the Army Corps existing NWPs.' 6 ' Nonetheless,
plaintiffs in Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains succeeded in
bypassing these procedures completely.
Although courts have recently failed to address the applicability of
Section 10 to water diversion structures, whenever courts have, in fact,
analyzed Section 10 it has been interpreted broadly. In United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., the United States Supreme Court reviewed Section
155. See id § 330.4(e). "The Corps reserves the right (i.e., discretion) to modify,
suspend, or revoke NWP authorizations." Id.
156. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
Courts have no authority to overrule an agency's rulemaking without following the standards
and procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (1994).
157. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(e) (2003). In United Texas Transmission Co. v. U.S. Army
Corps, 7 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit held that the Army Corps had the
authority to require a valid permit holder to pay for the relocation of pipes to accommodate
a flood control project. Id.; see also United States v. Alameda Gateway, 213 F.3d 1161,
1167 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Rivers and Harbors Act "allows the United States to
remove structures that were once erected lawfully but subsequently found to be obstruc-
tions").
158. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(e)(2) (2003).
159. See id § 330.5(b). This section provides, in detail, the procedures that must be
followed "for modifying, suspending, or revoking NWPs and authorizations under NWPs."
Id. § 330.5(a).
160. See id. § 330.5(d).
161. See id. § 330.5.
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10 precedent through 1960 and affirmed that Section 10 had always been
interpreted to have a "broad sweep." 62 Quoting an earlier opinion by
Justice Holmes, the Court in Republic Steel stated that anything "which
affects the water level may... amount to an 'obstruction' within the
meaning of [Section] 10. ''163 In United States v. Alaska, the Supreme Court
again confirmed that the language of Section 10 is "quite broad," holding
that the Army Corps "authority is not confined solely to considerations of
navigation [but may incorporate a whole range of environmental concerns]
in deciding whether to issue a permit under [Section] 10."'1" Summarizing
this Section 10 precedent in 1994, the First Circuit stated in United States
v. Estate of Boothby that the "Rivers and Harbors Act has been transformed
into an instrument of environmental policy. This transformation occurred
long ago."' 65
The water diversion structures in Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill
Mountains operate under existing Section 10 permits. " The procedure for
modifying these permits is clearly delineated in the Army Corps regula-
tions; they cannot be modified by Section 402.167 Moreover, Section 1371
of the Rivers and Harbors Act explicitly prohibits the CWA from impairing
the Army Corps Section 10 authority 's-authority that the Supreme Court
has always broadly construed."6 Were Section 402 applicable to existing
Army Corps permits, the EPA-and not the Secretary of the Army -would
retain final authority to revoke, suspend, or modify Section 10 permits.
However, this would flatly contradict the Army Corps implementing
regulations. 70  Most importantly, according to Miccosukee Tribe and
Catskill Mountains, the EPA could completely suspend existing Section 10
permits for failure to comply with Section 402."T' Given the history and
broad statutory mandate of Section 10 and Section 511's explicit terms, it
is, in short, inconceivable that Section 402 of the CWA empowered EPA
to invalidate existing Section 10 permits involving inter-basin water
162. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,487 (1960).
163. L at 488.
164. United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569,579-80 (1992). The Court pointed to along
line of precedent establishing a "broad interpretation of agency power under [Section] 10
that was consistent with the language used by Congress and was well settled by this Court
and the Army Corps of Engineers." Id. at 582.
165. United States v. Estate of Boothby, 16 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1994).
166. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.3(6) (2003) (issuing NWPs for "[s]tructures or work completed
before December 18, 1968" which, unless modified, "do not require further permitting").
Id.
167. See id. § 330.5(b).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. at 580.
170. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(b).
171. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
20031
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:65
transfer. At the very least, the CWA would have made such a broad
encroachment upon the Secretary of the Army's authority explicit. To the
contrary, Section 511 makes explicit that the Secretary of the Army's
authority cannot be impaired or affected. 7 2
B. The Army Corps Retains Sole Jurisdiction to Determine
the "Footprint" of Navigable Waters
The Army Corps jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act extends
"laterally to the entire water surface and bed of a navigable waterbody."'
'
This surface area "is not extinguished by later actions or events,"' 74 nor are
the boundaries "limited to the "natural or original condition of the
waterbody."'7 5 "However, a waterway in its original condition might have
had substantial obstructions" but may now constitute a navigable water. 76
Similarly, artificial channels, including canals, expand the boundaries of
navigable waters.'" The boundaries of a navigable water are therefore
considered partially as the "defined geographical limits of the
waterbody,"'178 that is, its entire surface area. Stated differently, the Army
Corps has jurisdiction over the "footprint" of navigable waters. 79
Whenever the outer boundary of that footprint is "impaired" or "affected,"
the activity is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Army Corps."W The
Army Corps alone determines the outer boundaries of navigable waters.
Whenever the boundaries of navigable waters are changed, whether through
the creation of artificial connections such as canals'"' or the filling of
wetlands pursuant to Section 404, the Army Corps retains jurisdiction
over that footprint boundary. Thus, expansion or declension of that
footprint requires the Army Corps permitting approval; it is not subject to
EPA jurisdiction. Accordingly, if a canal is built linking a navigable stream
and a lake, a new footprint-an expanded navigable water boundary-is
created. In contrast, the NPDES permitting scheme bears no relationship
to the navigable water boundary: the outer footprint of navigable waters is
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000).
173. 33 C.F.R. § 329.11(a) (2003).
174. See id § 329.4.
175. See iL § 329.8.
176. See iL § 329.10.
177. See id § 329.8(a).
178. 33 C.F.R. § 329.5(c).
179. See id.
180. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000); 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a)
(2003).
181. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
182. See id § 1344.
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not changed by the discharge of a pollutant from a point source regulated
by Section 402.1"3 A Section 404 permit for wetlands, however, by
definition always changes that boundary,'"' as does a Section 10 permit for
a water diversion structure between two navigable waters.!8 5 Thus, no
circumstance exists wherein a Section 402 permit can be required for
changing the footprint boundary of a navigable water in lieu of a permit
administered by the Army Corps.
Although any modification of a navigable water, including the
modification of its course or footprint, requires a permit, the Army Corps
exempts certain activities resulting in discharges of dredge or fill from
Section 404 permit requirements." 6 Any activity, however, involving
"alterations to flow or circulation" cannot be exempt from Section 404.87
The Army Corps also requires a Section 9 permit under the Rivers and
Harbors Act for the construction of a dam or dike; 1' these structures likely
change the pre-existing navigable water footprint through their impact upon
tributaries. Moreover, the Army Corps requires a Section 10 permit for any
obstruction or any other activity affecting the "course, location, or
condition of a waterbody in such a manner as to impact on its navigable
capacity.'.. 9 Thus, while the Army Corps jurisdiction cannot be said to
exclusively concern the outer footprint of a navigable water, it nonetheless
has a definitive jurisdictional orientation: the expansion and declension of
navigable water boundaries and the removal of obstructions to circulation
within those delineated boundaries all require Army Corps permits.
Accordingly, whenever a water diversion structure implicates these
footprint boundaries, the Army Corps clearly has jurisdiction over that
structure-and its continued operation. Understanding the Army Corps
jurisdictional primacy within this analytical framework will, it is hoped,
prevent courts and environmental practitioners alike from continuing to
overlook the relevance of Section 10 to water diversion structures in future
litigation.
C. Section 401 of the CWA as the Jurisdictional Link
Although Section 402 of the CWA has no applicability to water
diversion structures regulated by the Army Corps under Section 10, a
183. See id § 1342.
184. See id § 1344.
185. See id. § 403.
186. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2000).
187. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(c) (2003).
188. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
189. 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) (2003).
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jurisdictional link nonetheless exists between these permitted structures and
water quality requirements."9  Section 401 of the CWA requires all
applicants for a federal license or permit to obtain certification from the
state that the activity meets applicable effluent limitations.' 9' This
certification applies to both the construction and subsequent operation of
the facility. 192 If the state attempts to withdraw a water quality certification
that has previously been granted for an NWP, the Army Corps must
consider whether a suspension, modification, or revocation of the NWP is
warranted-and its discretion is exercised accordingly."9
To further concretize the jurisdictional relationship between Section
401 water quality certification and Army Corps jurisdiction, suppose, for
example, that a proposed activity involves the construction of a canal. In
that instance, a newly constructed canal would require a Section 10 permit
under the Rivers and Harbors Act,"9 a Section 404 permit under the
CWA-because the canal itself is considered fill material'--and a Section
401 water quality certification,"9 also under the CWA. The Section 401
certification would help to ensure that the construction and subsequent
operation of the canal complies with effluent standards; " this water quality
certification would therefore protect the same environmental interests that
the plaintiffs in Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains claim are
violated unless Section 402 of the CWA applies to these structures.'"
Thus, a Section 402 permit is not issued for activities under the Army
Corps jurisdiction because compliance with emissions standards is already
regulated through Section 401 of the CWA.'" Indeed, as Section 511
explicitly states, a Section 404 permit will be conclusive as to water quality
190. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
191. See id § 1341(a)(1) (2000).
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not
limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any discharge
into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a
certification from the State... that any such discharge will comply with the applicable
provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title.
Id.
192. Id. § 1341(a)(3). Permit applications will be "evaluated for compliance with
applicable effluent limitations and water quality standards, during the construction and
subsequent operation of the proposed activity." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(d) (2003).
193. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(c)(7) (2003).
194. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
195. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) (2003).
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
197. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(d) (2003).
198. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
199. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
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for any discharge resulting from a Section 10 permit.2' ° To be sure,
environmental plaintiffs may prefer to apply Section 402 permit require-
ments to structures under Army Corps jurisdiction in anticipation that more
stringent environmental regulation will be imposed under Section 402 than
would be required under Section 401. Nonetheless, their claim that the
CWA has no applicability to water diversion structures, absent the
imposition of Section 402 permitting requirements, is simply untrue:
Section 401 of the CWA applies to water diversion structures and all other
"facilities" permitted by the Army Corps under Section 10.2"
The Section 401 water quality certification also requires an analysis of
"both point and non-point sources of pollution."2o2 This has caused
Miccosukee Tribe petitioner South Florida Water Management District2 3
and at least one amicus o to argue before the Supreme Court that water
diversion structures are non-point sources of pollutants and are therefore
not subject to Section 402. The plain language of Section 401, however,
contradicts this assertion: "facilities" that "may result in any discharge"
must obtain a certification of compliance with six provisions of the CWA
enumerated in Section 401 . Although Section 401 does not explicitly use
the term "point-source," each of these six enumerated provisions concerns
point-sources. 26 Moreover, by Section 401's explicit terms, a water
diversion structure is a "facility"' requiring certification of compliance
with effluent limitations; were these facilities not point-sources, the
imposition of effluent limitations would not be possible. 2o
Missing the point completely, petitioner in Miccosukee Tribe also
argues that Section 304 of the CWA explicitly defines "flow diversion
200. See iS § 1371(a).
201. See iS § 1341 (2000) (requiring water quality certifications for any activity
including "the construction or operation of facilities").
202. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(d) (2003).
203. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, S. Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 2002 U.S. Briefs 626 (No. 02-626).
204. Brief of Amici Curiae, the City of New York et al. at 14, S. Florida Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 2002 U.S. Briefs 626 (No. 02-626).
205. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
206. Id. Section 401 requires compliance with "the applicable provisions of sections
1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title." id. Each of these provisions requires a
permit for a discharge only from a point-source.
207. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
208. Id. Permit applicants for the construction and operation of facilities will be
"evaluated for compliance with applicable effluent limitations." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(d). By
definition, effluent limitations require a point-source. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
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facilities" as non-point sources.' However, Section 304 does nothing of
the sort: Section 304 merely itemizes guidelines for non-point pollution
sources and methods for controlling pollution resulting from certain
enumerated activities, "including changes caused by the construction of
dams, levees, channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities."2 ' Section
304 is not, on its face, an enumeration of non-point sources, as the CWA's
legislative history further underscores. The Senate Report discusses
"diversion of freshwater flows in the construction of a dam or other
facility" in an entirely different section from its itemization of non-point
sources, which appears ten paragraphs earlier.2 ' The House Report,
meanwhile, has no discussion of these water flows whatsoever, excepting
"surface and ground waters," which are clearly non-point sources. 212 Most
disturbingly, however, is that this argument was made despite the fact that
these structures are "fill material"21 3 and are therefore subject to Section
404 jurisdiction as point sources. In short, the argument that a water
diversion structure is not a point-source quickly collapses once the CWA
is more appropriately viewed as consisting of both Sections 402 and
Sections 404--each of which regulate point sources as the sole basis for
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301 of the CWA.214
209. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, S. Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 2002 U.S. Briefs 626 (No. 02-626); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (Section 304 of
the CWA).
210. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (2000). Section 304 is a "guidelines" section of the CWA, not
a definitional or regulatory section; it requires the EPA administrator to issue "information
including (1) guidelines for identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of non-point
sources of pollutants, and (2) processes, procedures and methods to control pollution." Id.
(emphasis added). The listing of six types of activities follow both (1) and (2)- not as a
simple enumeration of non-point sources mentioned in (1), but including the broader rubric
of activities mentioned in (2) for which information would also be useful. Id.
211. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE WATER POUTION CONTROLAcr AMENDMENTS OF
1972, 93RD CONG. IST SESs., at 1470-72 (1973).
212. ld at 796-98.
213. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2003). In addition, the term "discharge of fill material"
explicitly includes "dams and dikes." Id. § 323.2(0 (2003).
214. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). Reliance on the weak statutory underpinnings of
Section 304 as a supposed definition of water diversion structures as non-point sources,
given the CWA's actual definition of point-sources as "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance," is a rather desperate grappling at straws. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). This
begs the question: why did defendants attempt to rely on Section 304 while ignoring Section
511? The only plausible explanation is that the respective courts and attorneys involved
lacked a basic jurisdictional knowledge of both Section 402 and the Rivers and Harbors Act;
ignorance of Section 10 thereby encouraged numerous eyes to simply gloss over Section 511
-without grasping its significance.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR
JURISDICTIONAL THINKING
This article has demonstrated that water diversion structures are not
subject to Section 402 of the CWA215 and are instead under the jurisdiction
of the Army Corps according to the explicit terms of Section 5 11.216 The
water diversion structures at issue in both Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill
Mountains21 7 operate under an existing Section 10 NWP2 18 which EPA has
no authority to modify.219 The Army Corps retains exclusive discretionary
authority to revoke, modify, or suspend NWPs. 2' Thus, Section 402 is
clearly inapplicable to structures operating under existing Section 10
permits.22 Despite this, two circuit courts,tm over a dozen amici before the
Supreme Court, 3 and, presumably, several additional score of attorneys
have failed to look beyond Section 402 of the CWA to address Section 10
of the Rivers and Harbors Act.22 The fact that this has occurred, even in
the context of established Section 10 precedent concerning water diversion
structures, 225 points to a systemic problem in the ongoing development of
environmental law.
Environmental law in its second-generation will unfortunately remain
a confusing array of isolated statutes unless courts and practitioners alike
begin to ask the jurisdictional questions necessary for environmental law
to mature into a comprehensive legal regime. The validity of a claim under
a particular statute cannot simply be assessed through an examination of
that statute's provisions; the first questions asked must instead be jurisdic-
tional in nature. With respect to any CWA claim, the first question to ask
is, always, whether the activity can conceivably be under either Army
Corps or EPA jurisdiction.' This can only rarely be assumed; it must
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
216. See id § 1371(a).
217. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
218. 33 C.F.R. §330.3 (2003).
219. See id § 330.5(b).
220. See id.
221. See 33 C.F.R. § 330.6(b). "Activities completed under the authorization of an
NWP which was in effect at the time the activity was completed continue to be authorized
by that NWP." Id.
222. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
223. A listing of briefs submitted with available links is available at http://www.earth
justice.org/backgrounder/display.html?1D=75 (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
224. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
225. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 292.
226. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2000). This does not imply that an activity can be
simultaneously subject to Section 402 and Section 404 jurisdiction; the two are mutually
exclusive. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3. It does mean, however, that considerable controversy exists
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typically be researched. Indeed, the line between Section 404 and Section
402 jurisdiction is often unclear.227 If the activity implicates the Army
Corps Section 404 jurisdiction" or involves a structure bearing any
relation whatsoever to waterways, the potential applicability of Section
102' must be addressed. Rather than continuing to delimit legal analysis
to the particular claim that is pled, environmental lawyers will accomplish
this greaterjurisdictional savvy only by acquiring foundational knowledge
of thejurisdictional overlap amongst all major environmental statutes. This
knowledge will, in turn, only be obtained by systematically researching the
environmental fact pattern at issue before the actual claims of a statutorily-
based pleading are assessed in depth. While this may not be the appropri-
ate manner for commencing research in other legal sub-fields, the
indeterminacy of environmental law presently requires new methods for
developing a more evolved, second-generation environmental jurispru-
dence. Unfortunately, the competing jurisdictional spheres of federal
environmental statutes have heretofore not been properly analyzed. The
conflict pre-emption and related environmental federalism issues inherent
in overlapping federal and state environmental jurisdictions have, similarly,
too often been overlooked. It is time, however, for environmental law to
enter into its second-generation of development-in a more substantive
manner than that of mere temporality.
Finally, while citizen group advocacy for novel interpretations of
environmental statutes is certainly understandable, the question nonetheless
needs to be asked whether the Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains
cases' have indeed been "good" for the future development of a more
comprehensive and stringent environmental legal regime. Assuming that
citizen groups desire--as do most environmental attorneys, present author
included-a more effective and complete form of environmental regulation,
how does establishing defendants' liability under a novel theory, thirty
years after the CWA's enactment, facilitate that future desired outcome?
I submit that it may not. The ultimate question for environmental law is not
whether plaintiffs succeed with novel theories in particular environmental
claims, but whether the legal-administrative state possesses the institutional
capacity for more pervasive environmental regulation to be implemented
in the future. The Miccosukee Tribe and Catskill Mountains cases
underscore the conclusion that the federal government's capacity to
in delineating the boundaries between Section 402 and Section 404 jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, 317 F.3d at 442.
227. See, e.g., Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, 317 F.3d at 442.
228. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
229. See id § 403 (2000).
230. See Miccosukee Tribe, 280 F.3d at 1364; Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481.
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regulate the environment, during environmental law's second-generation,
remains disturbingly weak" Environmental citizen groups must therefore
begin to contemplate how potentially undermining the integrity of a core
environmental statute, such as the CWA, can possibly further the future
adoption and successful implementation of more stringent environmental
regulation--4he achievement of which remains, at least rhetorically, these
citizen groups' ultimate goal.
231. See id.
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